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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a large number of cases
from administrative agencies during the recent survey period. One-fifth of
the cases involved disputes of agency interpretation of social security bene-
fits, with the remainder involving a variety of issues between federal admin-
istrative bureaucracies and citizens.
Traditional deference to agency action was apparent, with many of the
cases decided under the "substantial evidence" rule of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).' This is not to say, however, that the Tenth Circuit
automatically rubber-stamped all agency actions; several cases were reversed
and remanded when the court found that agency personnel or the district
courts acted arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion, or misinter-
preted the law.
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. Review of An Agency's Interpretation of Its Own Regulations
In Devon Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,2 the Tenth Circuit
held that an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations
controls the court's decision "unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation."'3 In 1973 Devon, a small natural gas producer,4 ac-
quired reserves from Commonwealth Group. Although Commonwealth's
jurisdictional sales had previously exceeded 10,000,000 Mcf, classifying it as
a large producer, its 1973 sales fell below that amount.
5
In 1976 Devon applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) for a small producer exemption,6 claiming that because Common-
wealth's sales in 1973, the year of Devon's acquisition, were below 10,000,000
Mcf, it was entitled to small producer treatment. FERC denied the exemp-
tion based on its unreported order which states that the status of a producer
is determined by the amount of sales in the preceding calendar year. Be-
cause Commonwealth's 1972 sales exceeded 10,000,000 Mcf, Devon had ac-
quired the reserves of a large producer and was not entitled to small
producer treatment. 7 The court ruled that FERC's use of the "previous cal-
endar year to determine status is reasonable, consistent with the regulations,
1. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976) provides that a reviewing court shall "set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be unsupported by substantial evidence .
2. 662 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. Id at 700 (citations omitted).
4. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40(a)(1) (1982) defines a small producer as one who sells less than
10,000,000 Mcf of natural gas during the preceding calendar year.
5. 662 F.2d at 699.
6. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40 (1982).
7. 662 F.2d at 699.
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and in conformity with previous Commission practice."
In a similar case, Blue Cross Association v. Harris,9 the court of appeals
overruled the district court and upheld the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' interpretation of the Medicare Act.' 0 On the local level, medicare
is administered by contracts with private health insurance companies such as
Blue Cross and Blue Shield. These "intermediaries"" and "carriers"' 2 are
reimbursed by the federal government on the basis of the reasonable costs
incurred in operating the program.'
3
The Act further authorizes the Secretary to conduct experiments and
demonstration projects to determine whether either fixed price or perform-
ance incentive contracts are more efficient than payment of reasonably in-
curred costs.14 The Secretary, pursuant to the Act, sought competitive bids
for administering an experimental program in Wyoming, Colorado, and
Utah. Blue Cross and various hospital associations sought injunctive relief,
contending that the hospitals involved had a right to nominate their in-
termediaries,' 5 that the Act defines those who may be carriers, 16 and that
the Act requires the Secretary to obtain advice and recommendations from
competent specialists before issuing requests for competitive bids. 17 The dis-
trict court agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments and issued an injunction
against the execution of an agreement based on the competitive bids until
she obtained the advice from specialists as required under section 1395b-
1(b)' and made a good faith attempt to negotiate with the plaintiffs.' 9
On appeal, the Secretary insisted that the section of the Medicare Act
that authorizes experiments and demonstration projects does not require the
agency to comply with the nominated intermediary and statutory carrier
provisions. 20 Even if there were reasonable differences in interpretation, the
appellants contended the district court should have deferred to the Secre-
8. Id at 700. See aLso Kaiser-Francis Special Account C v. FERC, 675 F.2d 249 (10th Cir.
1982), an analogous case, in which the court held that an "agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is entitled to great deference on appeal." Id at 250 (citation omitted). Accord River-
ton Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Block, No. 79-2238 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1981), in which the Tenth
Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming for reviewing day-
to-day administrative activities of the Rural Electrification Administration.
9. 664 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1981).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26,
42, and 45 U.S.C.).
11. See ifta note 15 and accompanying text.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
13. Id § 1395g.
14. Id § 1395b-1.
15. Id § 1395h.
16. Id. § 1395u(o) (1976).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-l(b) (Supp. IV 1980). This section provides:
No experiment or demonstration project shall be engaged in or developed under sub-
section (a) of this section until the Secretary obtains the advice of specialists who are
competent to evaluate the proposed experiment or demonstration project as to the
soundness of its objectives, the possibilities of securing productive results, the adequacy
of resources to conduct the proposed experiment or demonstration project, and its
relationship to other similar experiments and projects already completed or in process.
18. Id




tary's interpretation. 2 1 The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that the intent
and the language of the Medicare Act are clear that experimental contracts
are not restricted to nominated intermediaries or statutory carriers. 22 The
court added that assuming the statute authorizing experimental contracts
was ambiguous, "we must afford 'great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.' ",23
The court further noted that where agency expertise is required, the Secre-
tary's construction of a statute must be sustained if it is reasonable, even if it
is not the only reasonable one, "or the one which this court would have
reached de novo."
24
In Tsosi'e v. Caifano,25 the Tenth Circuit held that a court should defer
to an agency's interpretation of the statute, but not if the construction rests
on the interpretation of another agency's statutes and regulations. 26 At issue
in the case were dual benefits Mrs. Tsosie, a disabled widow of a veteran,
received from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 2 7 under the Social Se-
curity Act, and a surviving spouse pension from the Veterans Administration
(VA). 28 The VA pension of $227 a month included $118 for five children in
Mrs. Tsosie's custody. In addition, she received $27 a month in social secur-
ity widow's benefits. Her total income was thus $254 a month, but this in-
cluded the $118 VA allowance for her children.
29
In 1977, the Social Security Administration terminated the widow's SSI
on the ground that her income exceeded the statutory limit of $167.50 per
month. At a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected Mrs.
Tsosie's claim that the children's benefits should be excluded in determining
her income, and held that she was no longer eligible for SSI. The district
court affirmed the ALJ's decision.
30
On appeal, Mrs. Tsosie contended that the agency's action violated the
letter and spirit of the Veterans' Benefits Act 3 l and defeated the purpose of
the Social Security Act. 32 The Secretary argued that the language of the
Veterans' Benefits Act states that the Administrator shall pay the pension
"to the surviving spouse,"3 3 not to the children, indicating that the money is
intended to be the spouse's income.
3 4
The court ruled for Mrs. Tsosie, finding the Secretary's interpretation of
the applicable statute of the Veterans' Benefit Act was "unduly legalistic
and technical,"3 5 and gave little weight to the purpose and spirit of the Act.
21. Id
22. Id
23. Id at 810 (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
24. Id.
25. 651 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 722.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
28. See 38 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981).
29. 651 F.2d at 720-21.
30. Id. at 721.
31. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
32. 651 F.2d at 721. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
33. 38 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. V 1981).
34. 651 F.2d at 721.
35. Id. at 722.
19831
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Judge Seymour, writing for the court, likened the Secretary to "one who
listens to music for individual notes rather than for the melody: he misses
the theme."'36 The court held that the children's portion of a surviving
spouse's pension check is intended for the children's needs, and should not be
treated as the widow's income.
37
B. The Substantial Evidence Test
Section 706 of the APA provides that a reviewing court may set aside
agency action that is unsupported by "substantial evidence." 38 The United
States Supreme Court has described substantial evidence as "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'39 Because ALJs often weigh
conflicting testimony, courts are reluctant to overrule agency action based
on an interpretation of facts which is supported by substantial evidence. For
example, during the recent survey period the Tenth Circuit upheld ALJs in
four cases4° denying disability insurance benefits 4' because substantial evi-
dence indicated that although claimants were disabled, they were not totally
unemployable.
Typical of these cases was Campbell v. Harrzs,42 in which conflicting med-
ical testimony was presented regarding the extent of the appellant's disabil-
ity. Campbell had been totally disabled from 1974 to 1979. In June, 1979,
medical examiners determined that he had recovered sufficiently to return to
work. One physician, however, determined that, in his present condition,
Campbell could not work. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma upheld the ALJ in denying further benefits on the
ground that his position was supported by substantial evidence. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court, noting that although there was a disagree-
ment of medical opinion, there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's decision.
4 3
In Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. v. Marshall,44 a contractor failed to pro-
vide protective handrails for his employees working on the open second floor
of a building under construction. The court upheld an $800 fine approved
by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC).
45
Dun-Par defended by arguing that it did not create the hazard by tak-
ing down or destroying existing handrails, and that the responsibility for
36. Id
37. Accord Webster v. Califano, No. 78-3492 (6th Cir. July 10, 1980). Contra Whaley v.
Harris, 650 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
39. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
40. McKinney v. Harris, No. 80-2050 (10th Cir. May 13, 1982); Francis v. Harris, No. 81-
1492 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 1982); Chapman v. Schweiker, No. 81-1025 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 1982);
Campbell v. Harris, No. 81-1095 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 1982).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
42. No. 81-1095 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 1982).
43. Id slip op. at 3.
44. 676 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1982).
45. Id at 1338.
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erecting them rested on the general contractor. 46 The court disagreed, how-
ever, relying on Central of Georgia Railroad v. OSHRC4 7 and Bratton Corp. o.
OSHRC,48 which enunciate the principle that the contractual responsibility
placed upon another contractor to provide protection does not necessarily
relieve the employer of the same responsibility. The court found Dun-Par
had the primary responsibility for its employees' safety.
49
Although Dun-Par had been previously cited twice for handrail viola-
tions, it objected to the characterization of its offense as "repeated." 50 Citing
its decision in Kent Nowhn Construction Co. v. OSHRC,5 1 the court noted that
the congressional purpose52 stated in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) was to encourage employers who have been cited previously to
take the necessary precautions to prevent further violations. 53 Judge McKay
specifically rejected the Third Circuit's definition of repeated violations as
"intentional flauntings of the Act."' 54 Thus, based on Dun-Par's record of
two previous violations, the court held that substantial evidence supported
OSHRC's position that the contractor was subject to an enhanced penalty.
55
In Marshall v. M. W Watson, Inc. ,56 the Secretary of Labor appealed the
decision of OSHRC to reduce the citations entered against a contractor by a
compliance officer for OSHA. After a fatal cave-in at an excavation site,
Watson, a contractor, had been charged with failure to provide adequate
safety instructions for its employees5 7 and failure to meet specific trenching
requirements. 58 An OSHA compliance officer investigated the accident and
recommended a $900 fine for the first violation and, deeming the second
violation to be willful, assessed a $9000 penalty. Watson contested the cita-
tions. After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the first citation, modified the sec-
ond from willful to serious, and assessed a $50 fine. The Secretary's petition
to OSHRC for a review of the ALJ's decision was not granted, making the
decision final. 59
After a review of Watson's past safety record, the court found that sub-
stantial evidence supported the ALJ's dismissal of the citation for failure to
provide adequate safety instructions to its employees. 60 The court pointed
out that Watson had met its burden in training its employees in hazard rec-
46. Id at 1335.
47. 576 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1978).
48. 590 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1979).
49. 676 F.2d at 1336.
50. Id 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976) provides: "Any employer who willfully or repeatedly
violates the requirements of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order promulgated
pursuant to section 665 of this title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter may be
assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation."
51. 648 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1981).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1976).
53. 676 F.2d at 1337.
54. Id (citing Kent Nowlin Consir., 648 F.2d at 1282). See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1976).
55. 676 F.2d at 1338.
56. 652 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1981).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2) (1981).
58. 652 F.2d at 978. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c) (1981).
59. 652 F.2d at 979.
60. Id at 980.
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ognition related to their work.6 ' With respect to the trenching violation, the
court analyzed the conditions surrounding the fatal cave-in. Substantial evi-
dence supported the ALJ's assessment of the violation as being serious, not
willful.
62
The court of appeals overturned a decision by OSHRC in Capital Electric
Line Builders of Kansas, Inc. v. Marshall,63 holding that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to support the finding of any violation. After an acci-
dent in which a lineman was electrocuted, an OSHA compliance officer
cited Capital Electric for violations of three safety standards: 1) allowing an
employee to work too closely to energized parts without insulating equip-
ment, 64 2) allowing an employee to remove grounds without using insulating
tools, 65 and 3) allowing an employee to work in an aerial bucket without a
restraining belt.66 All violations were deemed serious. Upon discovering
that a Capital Electric employee had been electrocuted one year earlier,
OSHRC amended the complaints to upgrade the violations to willful.
67
After a hearing, the ALJ found that Capital Electric had willfully vio-
lated the three regulations and fined the company $10,000. 68 In ruling
against Capital Electric, the ALJ emphasized that a death had occurred and
that the decedent was not using or wearing insulating equipment or body
belts.69 Capital Electric contended that the death was the result of the em-
ployee's "unforeseeable, unanticipated" failure to comply with company
safety rules. 70 The ALJ ruled that the employer had the burden of proof to
establish unpreventable employee misconduct.
7 1
The court, relying on Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
OSHRC,72 held that the ALJ improperly allocated the burden of proof.73 In
Mountain States, the court ruled that the burden of disproving unpreventable
employee misconduct rests with the Secretary of Labor.74 The court in Capi-
tal Electric ruled that this burden can be met by showing that the violation
was foreseeable because of inadequacies in the [employer's] safety precau-
tions, training of employees, or supervision. 75 The court determined that
despite the ALJ's error in allocating the burden of proof, it was unnecessary
to remand the case. The evidence was insubstantial to support a finding
that Capital Electric failed to provide adequate safety precautions, training,
61. Id. at 979.
62. Id at 980.
63. 678 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1982).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.950(c)(1) (1981).
65. See id § 1926.954(e)(2) (1981).
66. See id § 1926.556(b)(2)(v) (1981).





72. 623 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1980).
73. 673 F.2d at 129.
74. Id. at 158. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1981). See also Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d
1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1975). But see H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir.
1981) (burden of proof placed on employer).




C. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Closely related to the substantial evidence test is the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard. Whereas the substantial evidence test emphasizes the
facts and the question of whether the facts support a given conclusion, 77 the
arbitrary and capricious test emphasizes the conclusion drawn from the facts
and the resulting action taken. 78 A case which illustrates this distinction is
Curtis, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission ,79 where the administrative ruling
was flawed by its failure to meet both the substantial evidence and the arbi-
trary and capricious tests.80
Story, Inc., an intervening respondent and the subject of the case, is a
small independent trucking company owned and operated by Harold Story.
In 1978, Story filed for interstate common carrier operating authority.
Before operating authority could be issued, Story was statutorily required to
prove to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) that
the company was fit, willing, and able to comply with applicable laws and
regulations. 8 1 At the hearing, the ICC presented evidence that indicated
76. Id. Other cases decided under the substantial evidence rule during this survey period
were: Romero v. Harris, 675 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1982) (court of appeals reversed lower court's
order requiring recipients to reimburse overpayment of SSI benefits, because evidence did not
support conclusion that recipients were at fault, and because evidence did show that recovery of
the overpayments would frustrate the purpose of Title XVI of the Social Security Act); Morris
v. Harris, 663 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1981) (Social Security Administration upheld in demanding
recovery of overpayment of survivor's benefits); Wilson v. Department of Health and Human
Serv., No. 81-1392 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982) (Merit Systems Protection Board upheld in revers-
ing its own hearing officer who deemed a resignation had been coerced); Longhat v. Andrus,
No. 80-1171 (10th Cir. Jan. 15, 1982) (ALJ upheld in determination of heirs-at-law, despite
conflicting claims and evidence); Mid-Continent Coal & Coke Co. v. Federal Mine Safety
Comm'n, No. 79-2271 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1981) (ALJ upheld in assessing a penalty for a safety
violation leading to a fatal mine accident); Gentry v. Califano, No. 78-1844 (10th Cir. Sept. 21,
1981) (ALJ upheld in determining free rent to be unearned income reducing SSI benefits);
Carrizo v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, No. 80-1675 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 1981)
(ALJ upheld in determining amount of overpayment of social security retirement benefits to be
recovered); Brown v. Railroad Retirement Bd., No. 78-1647 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1981) (Railroad
Retirement Board upheld in determination of decedent's beneficiary).
77. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
78. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974).
79. 662 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1981).
80. Other cases decided during the survey period in which the arbitrary and capricious
standard was applied include: Curtis, Inc. v. ICC, 669 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982) (in challenge
to ICC issuance of operating authorities, court deferred to ICC's interpretation of its regulations
and the underlying facts); Wolf v. United States, 662 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1981) (Department of
Agriculture upheld in suspending participation in food stamp program for six months for a store
permitting its patrons to purchase non-food items); Carter v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 656 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1981) (pension fund trustees upheld in
denying benefits to a teamster who failed the 20-year continuous service requirement); Hechter
v. Department of Health and Human Serv., No. 80-2086 (10th Cir. Apr. 27, 1982) (agency
upheld in firing employee for failing to do assigned work); Vickers v. Hampton, No. 80-1813
(10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982) (Civil Service Commission upheld in firing an employee for several
thefts of government property, despite its being the employee's first offense); Hawkins v. Merit
Sys. Protection Bd., No. 81-1267 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 1982) (Board upheld in deeming resignation
voluntary and not coerced); Curtis, Inc. v. ICC, No. 80-1486 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 1981) (ICC
upheld in challenge to its issuance of a certificate).
81. 49 U.S.C. § 10922(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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Story's past disregard of the law. Story had previously owned and operated
an agricultural cooperative and had "found it difficult" 8 2 meeting the legal
requirements of section 10526(a)(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act.8 3 He
admitted at the hearing that his interpretation of this section was " 'my ver-
sion of it.' ",84 The ALJ noted, " 'there was not the slightest sign of contri-
tion by Mr. Story for his past illegality . . . [and] his adherence to self-
serving, twisted interpretations of the law . . . can only be described as bra-
zen.' "85 Despite this evidence of unfitness, the ALJ awarded a three-year
conditional certificate to Story, apparently influenced by Story's background
in the transportation business and his military service during the Vietnam
War.
86
The ICC rejected the ALJ's reasoning as irrelevant, but approved his
conclusion. 87 The Commissioners noted that Story had never been cited for
any violations of the law and that the conditional certificate would keep the
company under close scrutiny. 88
Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, pointed out that Story had
the burden of proving fitness.89 Therefore, it was the reviewing court's re-
sponsibility to ensure that the record contained sufficient evidence to support
the Commission's conclusion that the applicant had sustained its burden. 9°
The record indicated that Story had violated, and at times, flaunted statutes
and regulations. 9 ' The court determined that this evidence raised a reason-
able inference that the applicant would likely continue to violate the law.
9 2
Judge Doyle noted that the Commission's decision to reject that inference
"might have been comprehensible had some evidence indicated that Mr.
Story intended to comply with the law in the future."' 93 In the absence of
such evidence, the record did not meet the substantial evidence test.
94
The court ruled that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious because it had disregarded substantial contrary evidence and ignored
relevant legal criteria. 95 Specifically, the Commission had failed to apply a
five-part ICC test 96 used to judge an applicant's willingness to comply with
82. 662 F.2d at 683 (quoting ALJ).
83. 49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).




88. Id at 685.
89. Id at 686 (citing St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 938, 940
(D. Vt. 1971)).
90. 662 F.2d at 686.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id (emphasis in original).
94. Id at 686-87.
95. Id at 687.
96. The five factors of the ICC test include:
(1) The nature and extent of. . . [the carrier's] past violations, (2) the mitigating or
extenuating circumstances surrounding the violations, (3) whether the carrier's con-
duct represents a flagrant and persistent disregard of [the] Commissions' rules and
regulations, (4) whether it has made sincere efforts to correct its past mistakes, and
(5) whether applicant is willing and able to comport in the future. ...
Associated Transp., Inc., Extension-TVA Plant, 125 M.C.C. 69, 73 (1976).
[Vol. 60:2
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the law when the record reveals past violations. 97
The ICC contended that the five-part test was not appropriate in
Story's case because the trucker had never actually been cited for any viola-
tions. The court rejected this argument, noting that this position is contrary
to other Commission pronouncements that "the existence of a criminal con-
viction or other court action is not a prerequisite to our considering . . .
evidence of unlawful conduct." 95
Concluding that the five-part test should have been applied, the court
reversed the Commission's decision as arbitrary and capricious. 99 The case
was remanded to the Commission for reevaluation of Story's fitness. The
court noted that sufficient time had passed since the issuance of the limited-
time certificatp to allow the Commission to determine whether "drastic im-
provement has taken place whereby the applicant demonstrates firm com-
mitment to compliance with the law, not only present but in the future as
well.""oo
D. Abuse of Dicretion
The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) abused its discretion in denying preferen-
tial status to an alien seeking a permanent visa in Mila v. District Director of
Denver.°10 Finau Mila, a native of the Kingdom of Tonga and a naturalized
United States citizen, sought preferential immigration status' 0 2 for his sister
by adoption, Anau Fainga. Fainga was adopted by her natural mother's
older sister (Mila's mother) shortly after birth and raised as a member of
that family.10 3 Tongan law only recognizes legal adoptions for illegitimate
children, and because Fainga was born legitimately, her adoption was by
Tongan custom. 104 The INS refused to grant Fainga preferential status, as a
sister by adoption of Mila, because it interpreted the section of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act' 0 5 defining adopted children as being limited to
those children legaly adopted.'0 6 The Board of Immigration Appeals af-
firmed, holding that "if the civil law of a country does not recognize adop-
tions, no immigration benefits accrue under United Stttes immigration laws
97. 662 F.2d at 688 (citing Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., Extension-Columbus,
Georgia, 131 M.C.C. 640, 643 (1979)). See also Berger Common Carrier Application, 119
M.C.C. 894 (1974).
98. 662 F.2d at 689.
99. Md at 688-89.
100. Id
101. 678 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denid, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) (confers preferential status to brothers and sisters
of United States citizens in qualifying for permanent visas).
103. Mila v. District Director of Denver, 494 F. Supp. 998, 999 (D. Utah 1980), rev'd, 678
F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983). For a discussion of the Tongan
practice of adoption, see Mila, 494 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
104. 678 F.2d at 124.
105. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1981) defines an adopted child as: "a child adopted
while under the age of sixteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and
has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years ....
106. Mila, 494 F. Supp. at 999.
1983]
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based on adoptions alleged to have occurred in that country."'' 0 7
Judge Winder of the United States District Court of Utah reversed the
agency, reasoning that there was a true parent-child relationship between
Mila's mother and Fainga. He held that the INS had "no reason to make a
distinction between a society or legal system where . . .[adoption] is sanc-
tioned by law or where it is only recognized by custom."' 08
The Tenth Circuit sided with the agency, holding that a federal court
may overrule the INS only if the INS abuses its discretion by basing its deci-
sion on an improper understanding of the law. 10 9 The court, per Judge
Logan, said that so long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable and not
contrary to the intent of Congress, it "should be approved even though it is
not the only reasonable interpretation or the one the reviewing court would
make if deciding the issue in the first instance."" 0  In this case, the INS
interpretation of the statute required the adoption to be legal in the country
where it occurred." I
The appellants contended that the INS interpretation was unduly re-
strictive and thwarted the congressional intent of preserving the family
unit.' 12 The court rationalized the narrowness of the agency's interpretation
as having practical advantages: decreasing the likelihood of fraud, serving as
a bright line to determine which adoptions will be recognized, and ensuring
that persons who bring adopted children to this country are legally responsi-
ble for them.' 13 The court also noted that the legislative history was not
clear enough to rule that the INS interpretation is wrong.'
14
Judge McKay dissented, arguing that the intent of Congress in adopt-
ing the definition for foreign adoptions was to preserve family relation-
ships.' 15 He stated that the INS interpretation "places too much reliance on
some formal juridical anglo-American notions of adoption and too little em-
phasis on whether the country recognizes these relationships as genuine fam-
ily units. ' 16 He noted that although the majority recognized that the test
of legal adoption cannot turn on inheritance rights because neither statuto-
rily- nor customarily-adopted children can inherit, the majority never de-
fined what constitutes a legal adoption.' 17 Judge McKay found no basis for
discriminating between customarily- and statutorily-adopted children and
believed the trial court's decision should have been affirmed."18
The interpretation of a statute granting discretion to the Secretary of
107. Id
108. Id at 1000.
109. 678 F.2d at 125.
110. Id
111. Id The INS relied on a previous case also involving a Tongan customary adoption, In
re Palelei, 16 1. & N. Dec. 716 (1979). In that case the Crown Solicitor of Tonga had stated in a
letter that a customary adoption "does not give the child any legal right in the estate of the
foster parent and is not recognized as legally valid under Tongan law." Id at 718.
112. 678 F.2d at 126.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id at 126 (McKay, J., dissenting).





Health, Education and Welfare in terminating benefits occasioned the con-
troversy in Faidley v. Harris.1' 9 Mrs. Faidley, a disabled widow, was receiving
SSI benefits. In 1978 she married a man who was receiving social security
retirement benefits. 120 According to 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1), the Secretary is
required to include any income and resources of a spouse who is ineligible
for SSI in determining the eligibility of an SSI beneficiary "except to the
extent determined by the Secretary to be inequitable under the circum-
stances."'' Mrs. Faidley's spouse, who was ineligible for SSI, received $295
per month in social security retirement benefits.' 22 This includable income
was $5.80 above the amount allowed by regulations. 123 Consequently, the
Secretary terminated all of Mrs. Faidley's benefits.'
24
Mrs. Faidley claimed that the Secretary violated its statutory duty by
failing to evaluate whether attributing her husband's income to her, so as to
disqualify her from SSI benefits, was inequitable. 125 The district court
found no violation of duty and affirmed the termination of her benefits. '
26
Relying on Hammond v. Secretar of Health, Education and Wefare, 1 27 the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the Secretary was not required "to engage in case-
by-case adjudications of inequitable circumstances .... ,,12' The court
held that the regulations 129 promulgated by the Secretary that provide for
exclusions from the general requirement of section 1382c(f)(1)13 0 accord eq-
uitable relief to beneficiaries. 13  It was within her discretion not to review
every inequitable situation of a claimant.
32
E. Interpretation of the Law
In Yoder v. Haris,133 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Social Security Ad-
ministration's (SSA) interpretation of a statute. Henry Yoder, a farmer, did
not file any income tax returns from 1962 through 1974. From 1964 through
1971, he belonged to farm cooperatives that bought milk from him. The
cooperatives filed tax returns (Forms 1099) with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) reflecting the amounts paid to Yoder. At some unspecified time
the IRS began auditing Yoder and required him to file delinquent tax re-
turns. Subsequently, Yoder applied for medicare benefits.1
34
119. 656 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1981).
120. Id at 583.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f) (1976).





127. 646 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1981) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(2) (1976) which uses
identical language to that of the equities clause in 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1) (1976)). For a review
of this case, see Adminitrative Law, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Sure, 59 DEN. LJ. 173, 186
(1982).
128. 656 F.2d at 584.
129. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100-1182 (1982).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c()(1) (1976).
131. 656 F.2d at 584.
132. Id.
133. 650 F.2d 1170 (10th Cir. 1981).
134. Id at 1171.
1983]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The SSA denied Yoder's request, ruling he had not established a record
of self-employment income. 135 In determining the right to medicare bene-
fits, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) examines and
maintains records of the self-employment income earned by individuals.'
3 6
The Secretary may correct these records if application is made within the
statutory time limit.' 3 7 In updating these records, the Secretary has author-
ity to conform his records to "tax returns or portions thereof (including infor-
mation returns and other written statements) filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue .... ,,138 If the time limit for updating records has ex-
pired, no amount of self-employment income may be credited to any ac-
count.139 Thus, there is a conclusive presumption that a claimant did not
have any self-employment income unless there is a timely correction in an
account or the filing of tax returns."40 In determining Yoder's eligibility to
receive medicare benefits, the issue before the SSA was whether the Forms
1099 filed by the farm cooperatives constituted tax returns within the mean-
ing of section 405(c)(5)(F).' 4' The SSA held the Forms 1099 did not consti-
tute tax returns because they did not show net self-employment income, but
only gross amounts paid to Yoder.'
42
The district court, however, ruled that section 405(c) (5) (F) is sufficiently
broad to permit the Secretary to update records from the Forms 1099.'43
The district court relied on Grzgg v. Finch,144 in which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that self-employment income for a music teacher
could be deduced from the Forms 1099 filed by a music conservatory.
145
The trial court ordered the SSA to credit Yoder with earnings from 1964 to
1971 in the amounts filed by the cooperatives.'
46
The Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that Forms 1099 did not constitute
tax returns of self-employment income for Social Security Act purposes.'
4 7
The court expressed its disagreement with Grigg and other supporting
cases,' 48 claiming the cases were not consistent with the language of the stat-
ute and its legislative history.'
49
135. Id
136. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(A) (1976).
137. Id § 405(c)(4).
138. Id § 405(c)(5)(F).
139. See id § 405(c)(1)(B), (c)(4). These provisions permit the Secretary to update records
provided application is made within three years, three months, and fifteen days after the year in
question.
140. 650 F.2d at 1172.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(5)(F) (1976).
142. 650 F.2d at 1171.
143. Id.
144. 418 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Maloney v. Celebreezze, 236 F. Supp. 222 (N.D.
Ohio 1964); White v. Celebreezze, 226 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Va. 1963) rev'don other grounds, 359
F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1966). Contra Shore v. Califano, 589 F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1978); Singer v.
Weinberger, 513 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1975); Martlew v. Celebreezze, 320 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1963).
145. 418 F.2d at 664.
146. 650 F.2d at 1171.
147. Id at 1174.
148. See supra note 144. The court said: "While we agree with the beneficent result in
Maloney, we do not agree with the court's loose construction of section 405(c)(5)(F)." 650 F.2d
at 1172 n.l.
149. Id. at 1172-73.
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Judge Logan reviewed the legislative history of the statute, noting that
self-employed persons were originally excluded from social security benefits
because there was no feasible method to determine eligibility.' 5
0 In later
amending the Act, Congress adopted provisions for determining eligibility
by means of examination of income tax returns, provided that the SSA's
records of self-employment income become final after the time limitation to
correct them has expired.' 5 ' The court ruled that the intent of the statute is
to permit limelyfiled tax returns to be used to determine self-employment
income. 152 The court held that the Forms 1099 showing patronage divi-
dends paid to Yoder did not show net self-employment income, and thus
could not be used to rebut the presumption that Yoder did not have any self-
employment income which arose because of his failure to file any income tax
returns for twelve years.'
5 3
In Martin v. Harris,154 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with
the problem of the award of a widow's social security benefits when the dece-
dent was a bigamist. In 1969, the appellant married Elmer Martin, who
died in 1972. His first and "legal" wife, Jennie Lamore, from whom he had
never been legally divorced drew social security benefits from his account
from May 26, 1972, until October 18, 1972, when she remarried and thereby
became ineligible for benefits.' 55 Mrs. Martin applied for widow's benefits
in May, 1973. The SSA originally denied Mrs. Martin's benefits but was
subsequently overruled by an ALJ on appeal. The ALJ found that Mrs.
Martin was eligible for deemed widow's benefits under a statute that deems
a marriage valid for social security benefits purposes if the applicant believed
in good faith at the time of the ceremony that the marriage would be valid
and she was living with the insured at the time of death.
1'5 6
Mrs. Martin drew social security benefits until September, 1977, when
the SSA Appeals Council reopened her case. Based on the fact that Jennie
Lamore had previously received benefits from Mr. Martin's account, the
Council ruled that Mrs. Martin was ineligible.' 57 This ruling was based on
an exclusion clause of the deemed widow statute which states that the provi-
sions shall not apply "[i]f another person is or has been entitled to a benefit
.. .on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such insured
individual and such other person is (or is deemed to be) a wife, widow, hus-
150. Id at 1173.
151. Id
152. Id
153. Id. at 1173-74.
154. 653 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. Martin v. Schweiker, 454 U.S. 1165
(1982).
155. 653 F.2d at 429.
156. Id 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(l)(B) (1976), states in pertinent part:
In any case where under subparagraph (A) an applicant is not . . .the widow . . .of
such individual, but it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such ap-
plicant in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with such individual result-
ing in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment not
known to the applicant at the time of such ceremony, would have been a valid mar-
riage, and such applicant and the insured individual were living in the same house-
hold at the time of death . . . then, for purposes [of the Act] . . . such purported
marriage shall be deemed to be a valid marriage.
157. 653 F.2d at 430.
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band, or widower of such insured individual .... "153
On appeal to the district court, the judge granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, ordered the SSA to continue Mrs. Martin's benefits, and remanded the
case to the agency for a determination of the meaning of the deemed widow
statute. 159 An ALJ heard the case, and again ruled that Mrs. Martin was
the deemed widow, but the SSA Appeals Council reversed. 16° The district
court upheld the Appeals Council, and Mrs. Martin appealed.
16 1
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, upheld the district court and the
Appeals Council. 16 2 The court concluded that the operative phrase in the
exclusionary clause is "if another person is or has been entitled to benefits
.... 163 Because Ms. Lamore had legally claimed and been given benefits
from Mr. Martin's social security account, Mrs. Martin was precluded from
claiming eligibility. 1
64
Mrs. Martin's main argument was that if the state in which her hus-
band was living when he died would find that the two were validly married,
she would be the widow.' 65 She also argued that one of the requirements
that must be met in order to receive benefits is that the widow be unmar-
ried. 166 She reasoned that because Ms. Lamore had remarried, she lost her
status as legal widow.' 6 7 The court dismissed both arguments by stating
"[tihis is not what the statute says."' 16 In support of its position that the
legal widow's rights are superior to the deemed widow's, the court cited cases
from the Third and Seventh Circuits. 169 The court also asserted that the
legislative history of the exclusionary clause verifies this interpretation.
70
In a vigorous and tightly reasoned dissent, Judge McKay disagreed
with the majority's "mechanical construction" of the deemed widow stat-
ute.17 1 He insisted that the statute was obviously intended to enable
"deemed widows,"' 172 to collect social security benefits. 173 The exclusionary
clause was added to prevent "double-dipping" whereby both a legal widow
and a deemed widow could dip into a wage earner's account. 174 To avoid
this situation, Congress gave priority to the legal widow over the deemed
158. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1976).
159. 653 F.2d at 430.
160. Id
161. Id
162. Id at 433.
163. Id at 431. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. 653 F.2d at 433.




169. Dwyer v. Califano, 636 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980); Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618 (7th
Cir. 1979); Woodson v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1978). But see Rosenberg v.
Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976) (the appellate court approved a plan whereby the legal
widow and the deemed widow shared the benefits).
170. 653 F.2d at 433.
171. Id at 436 (McKay, J., dissenting). See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1976).
172. See supra note 156.
173. 653 F.2d at 433 (McKay, J., dissenting).




Judge McKay argued that the proper interpretation of the exclusionary
clause in view of this legislative intent was to allow a deemed widow to ob-
tain benefits whenever the legal widow became ineligible for them. 176 Thus,
because the insured's legal wife was ineligible, he believed Mrs. Martin
should be entitled to receive the benefits as the insured's only eligible
spouse. 177 Under the majority's interpretation, however, "the statute would
confer a benefit upon 'deemed widows' only in the unusual case where no
'legal widow' has ever been certified to receive a benefit and where the Secre-
tary nonetheless learns of the impediment to the 'deemed widow.' "178 This




The influence of enabling legislation on the award of attorneys' fees was
aptly illustrated in two cases. In Wesley Medical Center v. Schwetker, °80 the
plaintiffs were a group of Wichita, Kansas hospitals who had won a suit in
May, 1979 against the Secretary of HEW challenging the method used to
compensate emergency room personnel administering to medicare pa-
tients.18 1 In January, 1981, the plaintiffs sought a new writ of mandamus,
complaining that the Secretary had not yet complied with a similar writ
issued eighteen months earlier. 18 2 The district court issued the mandamus,
and awarded plaintiffs costs, interest and attorneys' fees, based on a finding
that the Secretary had acted in bad faith.1 8 3 The Secretary appealed the
award of attorneys' fees and interest on the ground of sovereign
immunity. 184
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, noting, "[g]enerally, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the award of attorneys' fees
against the United States and its officers who are acting in their official ca-
pacity. . . . Sovereign immunity is not waived except by statute."',8 5 The
court, citing Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness Society, 18 6 ruled that there is no bad-
faith exception to the sovereign immunity rule.187 For the same reason, the
court overturned the award of interest,'88 relying on its own decision in
de Weever v. United States i89
175. Id
176. Id.
177. Id at 436.
178. Id at 435.
179. Id.
180. No. 81-1101 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1981) (per curiam).
181. Id slip op. at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id at 3.
184. Id
185. Id
186. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
187. No. 81-1101, slip op. at 4.
188. Id at 5.
189. 618 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1980) (interest may be assessed against the federal government
only pursuant to express statutory or contractual authorization).
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In Nunez v. Bergland,' 90 the issue was not whether there was statutory
authority for award of attorneys' fees, but whether the plaintiffs had pre-
vailed in the case.19 ' The case has a complex history, but the essential facts
are that a group of New Mexico citizens sued the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and the State of New Mexico for equitable distribution of food
under the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Chil-
dren.' 92 The appellants prevailed and were awarded attorneys' fees.193 The
USDA and the State of New Mexico appealed, but during the appeal, Con-
gress amended the program. 194 The amendments, by giving the plaintiffs
what they had requested, rendered the case moot.19 5 The USDA and the
State of New Mexico contended that because the case had been rendered
moot, the plaintiffs had not prevailed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting
that substantial precedent supported the proposition that "where the pro-
ceedings brought by the plaintiff act as a catalyst in achieving a primary
objective of the lawsuit, he can properly be considered a prevailing party
although he has not obtained a judicial determination on the merits."' 196
III. JUSTICIABILITY
Justiciability, the issue of whether a case is properly before the court,
was considered by the Tenth Circuit in several cases. Two cases were dis-
missed as being untimely. 197 In the following three cases, the court dis-
missed the suits because a justiciable case or controversy was not established.
A. Case or Controversy Requirement
In Environmental Improvement Division v. Marshall,198 the court upheld the
district court's ruling that insufficient injury had been alleged by the State of
New Mexico to confer standing.'9 9 The state had sued the Secretary of La-
bor to compel the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
to grant the state exclusive authority over its occupational safety and health
plan.2 0° 0 The Occupational Safety and Health Act 20 1 authorizes states to
develop their own occupational safety and health enforcement programs
190. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1981).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides, in part, that the party claiming
attorneys' fees must have prevailed in its action in order to be awarded the fees.
192. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705, slip op. at 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
193. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705, slip op. at 4.
194. Child Nutrition Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-627, 92 Stat. 3603 (1978).
195. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705, slip op. at 5.
196. Id at 7 (citing Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980); Morrison v. Ayoob,
627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199
(8th Cir. 1980)).
197. Mono-Therm Indus., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 653 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1981)
(untimely protest to Federal Trade Commission rule); Salt Lake County v. Donovan, No. 81-
2010 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 1981) (untimely request for review of a ruling by Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission).
198. 661 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1981).
199. Id at 863.
200. Id at 861.
201. Pub. L. No. 91-396, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amendment in scattered sections of 5, 15,
18, 29, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
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under federal supervision. 20 2 OSHA's rules envision a four-step procedure:
1) the state submits a developmental plan;20 3 2) after approval, OSHA su-
pervises and monitors the plan's enforcement for three years, but retains ju-
risdictional authority;20 4 3) during an optional period of concurrent
authority, OSHA may agree to release to the state the power to enforce parts
of the program; 20 5 4) OSHA grants final approval. 20 6 Final approval, or
"operational status," requires approval by the Assistant Secretary of Labor,
publication in the Federal Register, and publication of the description of the
plan in the Code of Federal Regulations.
20 7
In May, 1978, the Acting Regional Director of OSHA entered into an
agreement with New Mexico officials to confer operational status on the
state's program.208 In December, 1978, a new regional director rescinded
the agreement. 20 9 Citing several deficiencies in the state's program, he rec-
ommended reinstatement of concurrent authority. 2 0 The state brought suit
to compel OSHA to award the plan final approval, and to require the
agency to withdraw concurrent authority.
21 1
The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary, reason-
ing that New Mexico had not alleged sufficient injury to confer standing.2 12
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. Noting that the
May, 1978 agreement was never approved by the Assistant Secretary of La-
bor, nor published as required, the court ruled that the agreement was at
best "an informal interagency agreement which expressed a temporary de-
lineation of enforcement authority. ' 21 3 The court stated that although the
Act contemplates judicial review of final agency action, 21 4 OSHA's decision
to reinstate concurrent authority was an interlocutory decision; therefore, it
was inappropriate for judicial review.
21 5
In another case the court refused to review an interlocutory order by
FERC on the ground that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication. In Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC,2 16 the court ruled that FERC's order granting
belated motions to several parties to intervene in a tariff adjustment request
by Colorado Interstate Gas (CIG) was merely a procedural device, and not
202. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1976).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2(b) (1982).
204. Se 29 U.S.C. § 667(e) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1954.3 (1981).
205. Id §§ 1954.3, 1902.20(b)(1)(iii).
206. Id § 1954.3 (1981).
207. Id.
208. 661 F.2d at 862.
209. Id
210. Id The deficiencies found by the director included the state's incomplete fulfillment of
all the developmental steps, the insufficiency of the state's personnel to enforce the plan, the
unacceptable performance by the state in conducting compliance inspections, and the noncom-
pliance of the state's operational procedures with the OSHA Field Operational Manual. Id.
211. Id
212. Id
213. Id. at 863.
214. Se 29 U.S.C. § 667(g) (1976).
215. 661 F.2d at 864. See also Utah Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1973); Amer-
ada Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1956).
216. No. 81-1646 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1981) (per curiam).
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justiciable.2 17 Noting that the order "adjudicated no rights and resolved no
claims," the court determined that judicial action would be premature.
21 8
The court observed that provisions of both the Federal Energy Regulatory
Act 219 and the Federal Power Act 22 0 authorize judicial review of final FERC
orders for aggrieved parties, but not for procedural or interlocutory or-
ders. 22 ' The court said that orders may be reviewed only if they are defini-
tive, deal with the merits of a proceeding, and have some "substantial effect"
on the parties causing irreparable harm.222 The court rejected CIG's claim
that the expense and disruption of defending itself in hearings constituted
irreparable harm.
223
Finally, in Sacco v. United States Parole Commission 224 the court of appeals
dismissed an action as presenting no case or controversy. Sacco had chal-
lenged the Parole Commission's reasons for denying him parole as being ar-
bitrary and capricious. Before the appeal was completed, however, Sacco
was paroled. The court reasoned that because parole was the only relief he
sought, there was no case or controversy.2 25 The court pointedly rejected the
notion that the case was moot. The court distinguished the case from Wein-
stein v. Bradford,2 26 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled the case
was moot because the plaintiff's parole had already ripened into a complete
release from custody. The court noted in Sacco that the appellant was only
temporarily released from custody. Should he ever again come under the
control of the Parole Commission, the court pointed out, the Commission
would be required to make new findings of fact. 2 2 7 Thus, with a residual
issue remaining, the court was reluctant to declare the case moot, although it
presented no case or controversy at the time the appeal was considered.
228
B. Lack of Junsdction
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to consider several cases
that should have been tried in other courts possessing primary jurisdiction.
For instance, in Alamo Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Andrus,229 the appellate
court dismissed the case because the suit should have been tried in the Court
217. Id slip op. at 3.
218. Id. at 4.
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1976).
220. See 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1976).
221. No. 81-1646, slip op. at 3.
222. Id at 4 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375
(1938); Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Power Cornm'n, 557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977)). See also
Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 611 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1979); Atlanta Gas Light Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
223. No. 81-1646, slip op. at 4. The court cited Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 232 (1980), which held that even substantial litigation expense does not constitute
irreparable harm.
224. No. 81-2047 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 1982).
225. Id slip op. at 3.
226. 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam).
227. No. 81-2047, slip op. at 3.
228. Id at 2.




of Claims in accordance with section 1491 of the Tucker Act.
230
The dispute arose after the Alamo Navajo School Board (School Board)
contracted with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for the operation of a
new elementary school under the Indian Self-Determination Act. 23 1 The Act
empowers the Secretary of the Interior to fund such schools uniformly,
232
but also provides for a special fund for use in emergencies and contingen-
cies. 233 Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary established an Implementation
Set-Aside Fund (ISAF)234 to be used to adjust errors due to "underprojec-
tions, data error, misclassification of students. . . or to provide for the initial
funding of new schools ... "235 The contract allocated funds to the
School Board to operate the school for 180 days during fiscal 1980, which
ran from October 1, 1979, to September 30, 1980.236 The School Board
misunderstood the fiscal year requirement and expended all of the allocated
funds during the 180 school days between October 1, 1979, and May 30,
1980.237 Left without funds to operate the school in August and September,
the School Board sued the Secretary for ISAF funds on the basis that this
was an unforeseen contingency.
238
The district court recognized that the APA239 did not confer jurisdic-
tion because the plaintiffs sought money damages. 240 It concluded, however,
that it had both mandamus and federal question jurisdiction. 24' The appel-
late court disagreed, relying upon Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v.
Udall,242 which held that mandamus jurisdiction is inappropriate where an
official is exercising discretionary powers. The court ruled that the language
"emergencies or unforeseen contingencies," as contained in the statute au-
thorizing the ISAF, was ambiguous.24 3 The court concluded from its ambi-
guity that Congress intended to leave to the discretion of the Secretary the
determination of what constituted "emergencies or unforeseen contingen-
cies." 244 The court said further that mandamus is inappropriate where
other remedies are available. 245 The court stated, "'[m]andamus does not
supersede other remedies, but rather comes into play where there is a want of
such remedies.' "246
The court additionally held that the district court erred in accepting the
230. 664 F.2d at 233; see 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. IV 1980).
231. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 25, 42
and 50 app. U.S.C.)
232. 25 U.S.C. § 2008(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
233. Id. § 2008(d).
234. 25 C.F.R. § 31h.78 (1979).
235. 664 F.2d at 231 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 31h.79 (1979)); see 25 U.S.C. § 2008(a), (d)
(Supp. IV 1980).
236. 664 F.2d at 231.
237. Id
238. Id
239. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
240. 664 F.2d at 232.
241. Id
242. 355 F.2d 364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
243. 664 F.2d at 232.
244. Id
245. Id at 233.
246. Id (quoting Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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case under the federal question rule,247 which does not give district courts
jurisdiction over contract disputes that must be brought exclusively in the
Court of Claims. 248 The court determined that the case was indeed a con-
tract dispute, despite the School Board's protestations.2 49 The court stated,
"[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims cannot be avoided by
framing a district court complaint to appear to seek only injunctive,
mandatory, or declaratory relief."
250
The court of appeals denied jurisdiction in another case, Coalition for Fair
Utility Rates v. Baker,25 ' because plaintiffs failed to exhaust the remedies
available in state court. Plaintiffs, Oklahoma non-profit organizations
whose members are electric utility consumers, brought suit against the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, which regulates the state's public utili-
ties. 252 The purpose of the suit was to obtain a declaratory judgment au-
thorizing the Commission to award costs and attorneys' fees to consumers
who successfully intervene in ratemaking proceedings. The Coalition
claimed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)
253
authorized awarding such costs and attorneys' fees.
2 5 4
Initially, the plaintiffs had sought mandamus relief from the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to direct the Commission to set up procedures for awarding
fees and costs to intervenors. 255 The court ruled that the Commission's deci-
sion to award intervenors costs and fees was discretionary and dependent on
state law. 256 Additionally, the Oklahoma court ruled that PURPA provides
for a civil suit for fees against a utility in the state court.
25 7
The plaintiffs then filed suit in federal district court. The district court
dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs
had not been denied the right to intervene in a ratemaking proceeding by a
state court. 258 The court of appeals agreed, finding that PURPA provides
for federal jurisdiction only if attorneys' fees have been denied by a state
court.
2 5 9
247. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
248. 664 F.2d at 233 (citing Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081 (6th
Cir. 1978)).
249. 664 F.2d at 233.
250. Id (citing Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621, 628 (9th Cir. 1979)).
251. 656 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
252. Id. at 594.
253. 16 U.S.C. § 2601-2708 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
254. 656 F.2d at 593. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2632(a)(2), 2633(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981).




259. 656 F.2d at 594-95. See 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981), which states in part,
"[a] consumer . ..may collect such fees and costs from an electric utility by bringing a civil
action in any state court of competent jurisdiction ...."
The Tenth Circuit refused jurisdiction in another case, Sadegh-Nobari v. INS, 676 F.2d
1348 (10th Cir. 1982). The court ruled that an appeal of an INS refusal to consider a change of
immigration status should have been made in district court. Id. at 1350 (citing Cheng Fan
Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968)).
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C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The court of appeals applied the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine to several cases during the past year, achieving disparate results.
For example, the court summarily dismissed two cases, Wi/iams v. Carlson
2 60
and MShan v. United States ,261 in which inmates at the Federal Correctional
Institute at El Reno, Oklahoma, protested actions of prison officials. In each
case, the court noted that the prisoners had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies available to them.
262
A similar result from an entirely different set of facts was reached in
Haynes v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 26-1 Haynes, an American Indian, filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
protesting his discharge by Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. (ONG) and alleging
that the discipline was motivated by racial discrimination-a violation of
the equal employment opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.264 EEOC dismissed his charge, but issued Haynes a "right to sue"
letter. In his complaint filed against ONG in district court, Haynes broad-
ened his accusations against the company, alleging systematic discrimina-
tion, false accusations of misconduct, racial slurs, abusive language,
improper processing of procedural matters, and denial of company bene-
fits. 2 6 5 The district court dismissed the case on the basis that the "allega-
tions on the judicial complaint far exceed the allegations in the
administrative charge .... .. 66
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.267 The appel-
late court ruled that an employee's discrimination suit must be limited to
claims reasonably related to those made in the original complaint to the
EEOC. 268 To allow the appellant to broaden the charges after bringing suit
in federal court would "frustrate the . . . policies of'encourag[ing] informal
conciliation of employment discrimination suits and . . . avoid[ing] bypass
of administrative remedies.' "269
In New Mexico Association for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico ,270 however,
the court specifically declined to require the plaintiffs to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Furthermore, the court pointedly refused to invoke
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the case.
2 7'
This case arose under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 272 The
260. No. 81-1090 (10th Cir. Nov. 20, 1981).
261. No. 81-2216 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 1982).
262. See also Admnistratwe Law, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 211-13 (1981).
263. No. 81-2051 (10th Cir. Apr. 2, 1982).
264. Id slip op. at 2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1980).
265. No. 81-2051, slip op. at 2-3.
266. Id. at 3.
267. Id. at 5.
268. Id at 3 (citing Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973);
Donner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 477 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971)).
269. No. 81-2051, slip op. at 5 (quoting Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1981)).
270. 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
271. Id. at 851. The defendants argued that the Office of Civil Rights should have com-
pleted its investigation of the case before the court had jurisdiction. Id
272. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1980) prohibits discrimination against any otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual under any federally funded or assisted program.
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plaintiff association contended that New Mexico discriminated against
handicapped children by its failure to provide adequate therapy and serv-
ices, and by its inadequate funding of special education programs. The dis-
trict court found the state in violation of section 504 and ordered it to submit
a plan for compliance. 2 73 The trial court also permitted the plaintiffs to
prepare their own plan, which was ultimately adopted when the district
court rejected the state's plan as not being sufficiently responsive to section
504 requirements. 2 74 The state appealed, contending that the district court
erred on three grounds: 1) the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies and primary jurisdiction should have barred the suit; 2) the state was
incorrectly found in violation of section 504; and 3) the solution fashioned by
the district court was overbroad.
275
The appellate court easily disposed of the state's contention that the
district court violated the exhaustion of remedies and primary jurisdiction
doctrines, but reversed and remanded for further hearings on the other
grounds.276 The court recognized the similarity between the exhaustion of
remedies and primary jurisdiction doctrines, noting that both "promote
proper relationships between courts and administrative bodies through a
policy of suspending judicial consideration pending agency action. '2 77 Ex-
haustion requires that a claim be pursued at the administration level prior to
court intervention. 278 Primary jurisdiction mandates that disputes properly
pursued in either administrative bodies or in courts "are to be first decided
by an agency specifically equipped with expertise to resolve the regulatory
issues raised.
'279
The Tenth Circuit stated that courts must not mechanically apply the
exhaustion principle in every instance.2 80 It is those cases in which it is im-
probable that a plaintiff will obtain adequate relief from an agency action or
where delays will cause irreparable harm to substantive rights that courts
have dispensed with the exhaustion requirement.2 8' Noting that New Mex-
ico's administrative process could give neither adequate nor timely relief, the
court ruled that it would be fruitless for the plaintiffs to exhaust administra-
tive remedies.
282
The court ruled further that the district court was not required to in-
voke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and await the outcome of the Of-
273. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.M.
1980), rev'd, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
274. 678 F.2d at 849-50.
275. Id at 850.
276. Id. at 855.
277. Id at 850 (citing United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956)).
278. 678 F.2d at 850.
279. Id (citing United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334 (1959)).
280. 678 F.2d at 850 (citing Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973)).
281. 678 F.2d at 850. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979);
Pushkin v. University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Martinez v. Richardson, 472
F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973).
282. 678 F.2d at 851. The remedies provided did not include a restructuring of the system
to comply with the statute, part of the relief sought. Additionally, the time factors involved
were further evidence of the inadequacy of the available remedies. Id.
[Vol. 60:2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
fice of Civil Rights (OCR) investigation before proceeding. 28 3 The court
reasoned that the only punitive action the OCR could take was to cut off
section 504 funding for New Mexico, 28 4 and such "purse-string discipline"
would not vindicate the plaintiffs' rights.
28 5
Interpretation of the regulations 286 adopted pursuant to section 504
were crucial to the appellate court's reversal of the district court's finding
that New Mexico had violated the regulations.28 7 The district court relied
on language in the regulations that compels public schools to develop pro-
grams that "are designed to meet the individual educational needs of handi-
capped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are
met .... ",288 The Tenth Circuit, however, pointed out that this language
had been limited by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 28 9 which held that the Department of HEW had improperly inter-
preted section 504 as giving it authority to require affirmative action pro-
grams of all recipients of federal funds.29° The Act, the court insisted, was
designed to prohibit discrimination against the handicapped, not to order
affirmative relief.
29 1
The court of appeals noted, however, that the Supreme Court, in South-
eastern Community College, left the door ajar for some sort of relief for the hand-
icapped by suggesting that the "refusal to modify an existing program might
become discriminatory. '292 On this tenuous thread, but reinforced by Lau v.
Nzhols
2 9 3 and Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,294 the circuit court ruled
that the refusal by New Mexico to modify educational programs to permit
handicapped persons to achieve the same benefits as nonhandicapped per-
sons constitutes discrimination. 295 The court observed, "[u]nfortunately the
trial court failed to address the Southeastern Communit College guidelines in its
opinion and order."'296 Instead, the district court mandated an affirmative
action program. The circuit court remanded the case with instructions to
reevaluate the evidence and devise a solution accommodating the Supreme




284. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.64, 80.8 (1981).
285. 678 F.2d at 851.
286. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.54 (1982).
287. 678 F.2d at 852-54.
288. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1)(i) (1982).
289. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
290. Id. at 411-412.
291. 678 F.2d at 852 (citing Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 410).
292. 678 F.2d at 853 (quoting Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 412-13) (emphasis in
opinion)).
293. 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that discrimination occurs when programs are not modi-
fied for non-English speaking students).
294. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding operation of school system deprived Spanish
sur-named students of statutory civil rights).





IV. RULEMAKING PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
The rulemaking provisions of the APA298 were important to three deci-
sions handed down by the Tenth Circuit this past year. In Nademi v. INS,
299
the circuit court upheld the deportation of an Iranian student despite the
fact that the regulation under which he was removed was not promulgated
under the normal rulemaking procedure.
3 ° °
Nademi was ordered deported by an immigration judge pursuant to
section 241(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 30 ' He had vio-
lated the statute by failing to attend the college authorized by the INS on his
nonimmigrant entry visa. Nademi did not protest the action, but requested
a ninety-day delay to allow him to finish the semester. The immigration
judge denied the request, and ordered the Iranian to depart within fifteen
days, pursuant to a regulation amendment promulgated specifically for
Iranians during the 1979-80 hostage crisis.
30 2
Nademi contended that the amendment violated section 553 of the
APA because its promulgation was not preceded by notice and comment.
30 3
The court held that the amendment was exempt from section 553 require-
ments3° 4 under the "foreign affairs function" 30 5 and the "good cause"
exclusions.
306
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the regulation denied
them equal protection of the laws in violation of the fifth amendment.
30 7
The court relied on Malek-Marzban v. INS,30 8 where the Fourth Circuit held
that a classification of aliens must be sustained if it has a rational basis.
30 9
The court quoted with approval the Fourth Circuit's statement that the
"United States is not bound to treat the nationals of unfriendly powers with
the same courtesy and consideration it extends to nationals of friendly pow-
298. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
299. 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 161 (1982). This was a consoli-
dated appeal that included Sadegh-Pour v. INS, with identical grounds for appeal as Nademi.
679 F.2d at 812.
300. Id at 814.
301. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1976).
302. 679 F.2d at 813; see 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1981), which reads in part, "[i]n the case of a
national of Iran, the amount of time within which he/she may be granted to depart voluntarily
... shall not exceed 15 days from the date the special inquiry officer renders his/her decision in
the case."
303. 679 F.2d at 813.
304. d at 814 (citing Malek-Marzban v. INS, 633 F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981)).
305. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1976) which reads in part, "[tihis section applies ... except to
the extent that there is involved ... a military or foreign affairs function of the United States
306. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) which reads in part, "this subsection does not apply
(B) when the agency for good cause finds . . .that notice and public procedure thereon are
impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." See also Yassini v. Crosland, 618
F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980).
307. 679 F.2d at 815.
308. 633 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981).
309. Id. at 116. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
957 (1980); Alvarez v. District Director, 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918
(1977); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); Dunn v.
INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ers."3 1 0 The petitioners' contentions that the Commissioner exceeded his au-
thority were dismissed without extensive discussion.
3 "1
In Vzt l v. Andrus,3 12 the court of appeals set aside a BIA action that
transferred a free school lunch program for off-reservation Indians to the
Department of Agriculture (USDA), because the BIA failed to comply with
the notice requirement of section 553 of the APA.3 13  Under the Johnson-
O'Malley Act,3 14 Indian children attending off-reservation schools were pro-
vided free lunches regardless of need. To simplify its operation and reduce
costs, the BIA decided to transfer the public-school portion of the program to
the USDA, which was already providing free lunches in public schools on a
need basis. 3 15 The plan of transfer included a phase-in, phase-out period
extending for three years. The plan anticipated that during the 1973-74
school year, Indian children in public schools would not receive free lunches
unless they could establish need.
3 16
Prior to transferring the program, neither the BIA nor the USDA held
evidentiary hearings or rulemaking proceedings, nor did either agency give
public notice of the change, as required by the APA.3 17 The district court
ruled that the alteration of the school lunch program fell within the con-
tracts exception to the APA and that compliance with the formal rulemak-
ing procedures was not necessary.3 18 The Tenth Circuit reversed, noting
that congressional intent,3 19 precedent, 32 0 and the BIA's own rules32 1 all
supported the position that formal rulemaking procedures should be
followed.322
The court stated that the government must "bend over backwards" to
assure fair treatment to Indians when terminating benefits that have long
been provided. 323 The appellate court ordered the BIA to undertake formal
rulemaking if it chose to continue with the transfer plan.
32 4
310. 679 F.2d at 815 (quoting Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981)).
See also Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
311. The court found that there was a clear line of delegation of power from Congress to the
President to the Commissioner, and that the Commissioner was merely implementing foreign
policy, not formulating it. 679 F.2d at 814 (citing Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1980)).
312. 667 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
313. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
314. 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-457 (1976).
315. National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1768 (1976).
316. 667 F.2d at 933.
317. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1976).
318. Id. § 553(a)(2) exempts from the rulemaking requirements matters relating to, inter alia,
public contracts.
319. 667 F.2d at 934-35.
320. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286
(1942). See genera/y Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property,
Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
321. Subsequent to a recommendation by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, the Department of Interior (including the BIA) adopted a rule stating that it agreed to
follow rulemaking procedures even if the subject matter was within the APA's exceptions for
grants, benefits and contracts. 36 Fed. Reg. 8,336 (197 1).
322. 667 F.2d 935-37.
323. Id. at 939 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974)).
324. 667 F.2d at 939.
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In another case, American Mining Congress v. Marshall,325 the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) rule that
was challenged both substantively and procedurally by the mining industry.
At issue was a regulation 326 promulgated by MSHA pursuant to the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 327 This regulation requires mine opera-
tors to initiate area sampling programs for respirable dust in addition to the
personal sampling program required for miners in high risk areas.328 The
industry attacked the area sampling program on the grounds that it was
selected in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 329 and that the rulemaking
procedures established by the APA were not followed. 330 The court rejected
the arbitrary and capricious challenge, and ruled that the choice of sampling
methods and techniques were within the Secretary's discretion. 33t
The plaintiff contended the area sampling regulation was procedurally
invalid because certain documents in the rulemaking record were not date-
stamped, and the index omitted some documents while including some doc-
uments dated after the close of the comment period. These deficiencies, the
plaintiff maintained, deprived it of its right to comment and made "mean-
ingful judicial review impossible."' 332 The court, in rejecting this argument,
pointed out that the APA makes no mention of these requirements, citing
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 333
In Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court held that "formulation of procedures
[beyond those required by the APA is] basically to be left within the discre-
tion of the agencies. . . . 334 After reviewing the APA rulemaking require-
ments and the record of this case, the Tenth Circuit court determined that
the procedure had been correct and substantially complete.
335
V. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE PRIVACY ACTS
Three cases decided during the past year suggest that there is some
agency and lower court confusion over the correct interpretation of the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA)3 36 and the Privacy Act of 1974. 3 3 7 Alirez v.
NLRB,33 8 exemplifies this confusion. In Alirez the court of appeals reversed
the district court's interpretation of the FOIA. 33 9 This case arose after
325. 671 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982).
326. 30 C.F.R. § 70.208 (1981).
327. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
328. The personal sampling program is required by 30 C.F.R. § 70.207 (1981).
329. 671 F.2d at 1255-57.
330. Id at 1260-63.
331. The court noted that there is no perfect sampling method, and that the Secretary has
discretion to adopt any method that measures respirable dust concentration with reasonable
accuracy, even if the method is more burdensome to mine operators. Id at 1256. The plaintiff
also attacked various technical aspects of the area sampling program, but the court refused "to
substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary." Id at 1260.
332. Id at 1260-61.
333. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
334. 435 U.S. at 524, quoted in American Mining Congress, 671 F.2d at 1261.
335. 671 F.2d at 1262.
336. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
337. Id § 552a.
338. 676 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1982).
339. Id at 428.
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Alirez filed unsuccessful unfair labor practices charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB) against his employer. The plaintiff then re-
quested access to the NLRB's investigatory file in the case. The Board
offered Alirez access to all documents except sixteen, which it deemed ex-
empt from disclosure. 3 4 0 Fourteen of the documents were statements by in-
formants, many of whom indicated they feared retaliation.3 4 1 The plaintiff
brought suit to force disclosure of the withheld documents under the FOIA.
The district court granted the plaintiff's motion, determining that disclosure
of the documents would not be an invasion of privacy contemplated by the
FOIA.342 However, it permitted the Board to delete data identifying the
informants.3 4 3 The NLRB appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the
lower court.
The appellate court noted that the FOIA is to be broadly construed in
favor of disclosure,3 44 that statutory exemptions are to be narrowly con-
strued,3 45 and that the burden of justifying nondisclosure is placed upon the
agency.3 46 Noting that the lower court had based its decision primarily on
Poss v. NLRB, 347 the appellate court reviewed Poss and established that the
plaintiff in that case compelled disclosure of informants' statements that
were not truly sensitive in nature.348 In Alirez, however, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that the district court abused its discretion by not taking the fact that
disclosure of the informants' statements would result in "serious invasions of
privacy, potentially subjecting Board informants and others to embarrass-
ment of reprisals from Mr. Alirez and their employer," into account.
349
The court noted that in cases similar to Ahrez a balancing of interests is
necessary; the court must determine whether the invasion of privacy is out-
weighed by the public interest in disclosure. Because the plaintiff sought the
documents for personal information only, the court found no public
interest.
350
Misunderstanding of the FOIA and the Privacy Act was also evident in
Wren v. Hams,35' a case in which the appellant was refused access to his
personal file held by the SSA. Mr. Wren sought access to his records under
the Privacy Act. 352 The district court prohibited disclosure under the exclu-
sion provisions of the FOIA. 353 The court of appeals reversed, suggesting
340. Id at 425. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
341. 676 F.2d at 425.
342. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976).
343. 676 F.2d at 425.
344. Id. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
345. 676 F.2d at 425. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1976).
See also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973).
346. 676 F.2d at 425 (citing Campbell v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58,
61 (10th Cir. 1976)).
347. 565 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1977).
348. 676 F.2d at 426.
349. Id. at 427.
350. Id
351. 675 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1982).
352. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); 675 F.2d at 1145. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (b)(6) (1976).
353. 675 F.2d at 1146.
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that the district court's order demonstrated a "fundamental misunderstand-
ing" of the relationship between the two acts.
3 54
The Tenth Circuit compared the primary purposes of the Privacy Act
and the FOIA, stating that, whereas the thrust of the FOIA is to "pierce the
veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny,"3 55 the purpose of the Privacy Act is to promote "governmental
respect for the privacy of citizens by requiring all departments . . . to ob-
serve . . . rules in the . . . management, use, and disclosure of personal in-
formation about individuals. '3 56 Although the Privacy Act severely limits
third party access to records, it permits the individual to read and copy his
own records. 35 7 On this basis, the court concluded that the Privacy Act pro-
vides the individual greater rights with respect to his own records than to the
public generally.
358
The Tenth Circuit observed that the district court made no attempt to
construe Mr. Wren's rights in light of the Privacy Act, but rather at the
insistence of the appellees, applied the exemptions of the FOIA. Because of




Administrative law reflects the inevitable friction created at the inter-
face between governmental bureaucracies and the citizens they serve. The
cases decided by the Tenth Circuit were more notable for their evenhanded
application of the law than for equitable considerations. What the decisions
lost in compassion and sympathy, they gained in stability and predictability
in the law.
Michael G Cooksey
354. 675 F.2d at 1145.
355. Id (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).
356. 675 F.2d at 1145-46 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 6916).
357. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1976) provides in part that each agency shall "upon request by any
individual to gain access to his record . . . permit him . . . to review the record and have a
copy made of all or any portion thereof .
358. 675 F.2d at 1146.
359. Id. at 1148. The Tenth Circuit decided another case, Hernandez v. Alexander, 671
F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982), similar to the dispute in A1rez, discussed supra at notes 335-346 and
accompanying text. In Hernandz, all parties except the appellant appeared to agree on the
construction of the Privacy Act and the FOIA.
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